Judge Myron Bright by Lay, Donald P.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1998
Judge Myron Bright
Donald P. Lay
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lay, Donald P., "Judge Myron Bright" (1998). Minnesota Law Review. 1158.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1158
Judge Myron Bright
Donald P. Layt
It is only fitting and proper that a great law school should
honor one of its most notable graduates, Myron Bright. It is
my privilege to accept Dean Sullivan's kind invitation to write
a short tribute to my friend and judicial colleague. In the fall
of 1968, Myron Bright was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit by President Lyndon
Johnson. Less than two years earlier, in December 1966, Ger-
ald Heaney joined the court as the then new eighth judge.
Some six months before that, in the fall of 1966, I was ap-
pointed to the court.
It was understandable that the three of us, appointed
within that short span of time by the same President, would
form an enduring bond of friendship, both on and off the court.
None of us realized at the time that this friendship would con-
tinue for some thirty odd years, and the final chapter has yet to
be written. We each came to the court directly from private
practice, which engaged us in similar representations, and we
shared common goals-primarily to strive for procedural fair-
ness and equal justice under the law.
Bob Tucker, our former clerk of court, tells a humorous
story. During the aftermath of the Little Rock school integra-
tion cases in the early 1970s, our court reaffirmed again and
again the basic doctrine of Brown v. Board of Education1 and
applied its principles in varying cases. The school district
challenged every proposed legal advance and continually liti-
gated issues, hoping to find a panel of judges that would be
sympathetic to its cause. As we prepared to hear one of these
appeals, the attorney for the school board called Bob Tucker
and asked which judges were sitting on the panel the day he
was to argue a school board appeal. Tucker told the attorney
that it would be Judges Heaney, Bright and Lay. The school
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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board attorney responded in turn, "Oh xxxx!" From that day
on, Bob Tucker continued to refer to the panel of Judges
Heaney, Bright and Lay as the "Oh xxxx!" panel.
The common faith the three of us shared first manifested
itself in a dissent in which Judges Bright and Heaney joined
me in recognizing that state prisoners did not lose their consti-
tutional rights once incarcerated. The case was Morrissey v.
Brewer.2 Morrissey was a parolee. He was arrested by direc-
tion of his parole officer, taken from his home and family, and
sent back to prison because his parole officer "thought" he had
violated his parole. Morrissey did not receive any notice or
hearing before he was sent back to the prison. His family and
friends did not know where he was for over three days.
Our court heard the case en banc and the majority voted to
uphold the old "hands off' doctrine, leaving state prisoners to
be treated or mistreated at the discretionary whim of the state.
Judge Bright, Judge Heaney and I dissented on the ground
that we felt Morrissey as a "person" was deprived of "due proc-
ess of law" by the "state." We urged that nothing could be
plainer under the express terms of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 We were elated when the Supreme Court in the next
term reversed our en banc court and agreed with our dissent.4
This was one of the first cases to recognize that a state pris-
oner's right to due process is not abandoned at the prison gate.
With the advent of the Morrissey case, a true kinship be-
gan between Judge Bright, Judge Heaney and me. I have pre-
viously written about Judge Heaney's lifelong pursuit of equal
justice in the school integration cases.5 On the other hand,
Judge Bright became an early leader on our court and
throughout the nation in carving out procedural fairness and
substantive rights under the EEOC regulations and in Title
VII and employment discrimination cases.6
2. 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
3. See 443 F.2d at 952 (Lay, J. dissenting).
4. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
5. See Donald P. Lay, A Tribute to My Friend and Colleague: Judge Ger-
ald W. Heaney, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1997).
6. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Maternity Benefits Litig., 602
F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Roberts Dairy Co., 572 F.2d 1271 (8th
Cir. 1978); Meyer v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 567 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.
1977); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); DeGraffenreid v.
General Motors Assembly Div., St. Louis, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Drake
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1977); Lacy v. Chrysler
Corp., 533 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Laclede Gas Co., 530 F.2d 281
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Perhaps no Supreme Court case has been cited more in
modem history than McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.7 This
case has become the paradigm for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants in handling employment discrimination cases. It has
been applied in racial, gender, and age discrimination cases.
Recognizing that direct discrimination can seldom be proven,
the Supreme Court set out the basic requirements by which
plaintiffs can make a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation. What is not well known is that the appeal originated in
the Eighth Circuit, and the opinion was authored by Judge
Bright.8 I joined Judge Bright and wrote a concurring opinion.
My predecessor, Judge Harvey Johnson of Omaha, had dis-
sented. My reason for mentioning this case is that Judge
Bright formulated the test the Supreme Court followed that
has proven to be universally accepted throughout the country.
Judge Bright wrote on the original appeal:
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifica-
tions to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, we think he
presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the bur-
den passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the reasons offered for denying employment and the re-
quirements of the job....
If McDonnell can demonstrate that Green's participation in
the "stall-in" in some objective way reflects adversely upon job per-
formance, McDonnell's refusal to rehire Green will be justified. But,
if McDonnell's refusal to rehire Green rests upon management's per-
sonal dislike for Green or personal distaste for his conduct in the civil
rights field, Green is entitled to some relief.9
Judge Bright has participated in hundreds of cases that
have had an impact upon every phase and interest in our so-
cial, political and economic environment. He shares a common
disdain with Judge Heaney and me for the inequities and
harsh sentences that have evolved from the United States Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. 10
(8th Cir. 1976); Haire v. Calloway, 526 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1975); Green v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F.2d 1003 (8th
Cir. 1973); Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
7. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. See Green, 463 F.2d at 337.
9. Id. at 344.
10. See United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995)
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Justice Hugo Black wrote in Chambers v. Florida, "Under
our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer
because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they
are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excite-
ment."'I No judge has better epitomized this judicial philoso-
phy than Myron Bright.
In thirty years time, Judge Bright has brought unusual
humor and understanding to complex cases. I have been
privileged to share many of his family experiences. His dear
wife, Fritzie, shares Myron's compassion for equal justice and
should share in this recognition as well.
From time to time, one wonders what makes a human be-
ing more caring and concerned about the rights and feelings of
others. Perhaps it lies within the soul; yet surely life's experi-
ences help mold such basic characteristics. Judge Bright grew
up in a time when our government and the majority of our
country were indifferent to the status of those who were eld-
erly, female, handicapped, or belonged to a minority race. His
early years provided first-hand observation of religious bias
and prejudice. Myron became inculcated with tenets of fair-
ness and justice by watching others practice unfairness and
injustice. These experiences undoubtedly became affixed in his
conscience and played a major role in developing his basic
compassion for the fair treatment of others.
Our nation has been truly honored by having Myron
Bright, rich in his heritage and experiences, as a judicial officer
of the United States. I know I speak for all of his judicial col-
leagues in honoring him on this grand occasion.
(Bright, J., concurring).
11. 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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